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NOTES
A CONSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT
OF COURT RULES RESTRICTING LAWYER
COMMENT ON PENDING LITIGATION
In Sheppard v. Maxwell,' the Supreme Court reversed a mur-
der conviction because the trial judge had failed to protect the
defendant from massive prejudicial publicity.2 Alarmed by the
increase in prejudicial news comment, the Court sternly warned
that "[c]ollaboration between counsel and the press as to informa-
tion affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to
regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary
measures." 3  This 1966 decision inspired Disciplinary Rule 7-107
(DR 7-107) of the American Bar Association's Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. 4  The rule severely restricts a lawyer's right
to comment when participating in a criminal investigation, a crim-
inal action, a civil action, an administrative proceeding, a juvenile
disciplinary proceeding, or a professional disciplinary proceed-
ing.5
1 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
2 In Sheppard, the numerous prejudicial newspaper, radio, and television stories and
editorials, some quoting police officers and prosecuting attorneys, and the reporters,
photographers and cameramen swarming around the courtroom affected the trial atmos-
phere. See also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (presence of television cameras record-
ing trial proceedings over defendant's objections found to violate due process).
3 384 U.S. at 363.
See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 96 (1968); ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 44 n.85 (1978). The
Warren Commission, commenting on the events surrounding the apprehension and death
of Lee Harvey Oswald, stated, "The experience in Dallas during November 22-24 is a
dramatic affirmation of the need for steps to bring about a proper balance between the
right of the public to be kept informed and the right of the individual to a fair and
impartial trial." REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESICe
DENT KENNEDY 99 (Associated Press 1964). This statement also provided inspiration for DR
7-107. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 19, 19 n.I (1968). See
also Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial"
Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1969).
5 DR 7-107 states:
DR 7-107 Trial Publicity.
(A) A lawyer participating in or associated with the investigation of a criminal
matter shall not make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement
that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of pub-
lic communication and that does more than state without elaboration:
(1) Information contained in a public record.
(2) That the investigation is in progress.
(3) The general scope of the investigation including a description of the
offense and, if permitted by law, the identity of the victim.
(4) A request for assistance in apprehending a suspect or assistance in
other matters and the information necessary thereto.
(5) A warning to the public of any dangers.
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DR 7-107 has been challenged on first amendment grounds
in two declaratory judgment actions. The Court of Appeals for
(B) A lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a crimi-
nal matter shall not, from the time of the filing of a complaint, informa-
tion, or indictment, the issuance of an arrest warrant, or arrest until the
commencement of the trial or disposition without trial, make or participate
in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect
to be disseminated by means of public communication and that relates to:
(1) The character, reputation, or prior criminal record (including arrests,
indictments, or other charges of crime) of the accused.
(2) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or to a lesser
offense.
(3) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement
given by the accused or his refusal or failure to make a statement.
(4) The performance or results of any examinations or test or the refusal
or failure of the accused to submit to examinations or tests.
(5) The identity, testimony, or credibility of a prospective witness.
(6) Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the evidence,
or the merits of the case.
(C) DR 7-107(B) does not preclude a lawyer during such period from announc-
ing:
(1) The name, age, residence, occupation, and family status of the accused.
(2) If the accused has not been apprehended, any information necessary to
aid in his apprehension or to warn the public of any dangers he may
present.
(3) A request for assistance in obtaining evidence.
(4) The identity of the victim of the crime.
(5) The fact, time, and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of
weapons.
(6) The identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the
length of the investigation.
(7) At the time of seizure, a description of the physical evidence seized,
other than a confession, admission, or statement.
(8) The nature, substance, or text of the charge.
(9) Quotations from or references to public records of the court in the
case.
(10) The scheduling or result of any step in the judicial proceedings.
(11) That the accused denies the charges made against him.
(D) During the selection of a jury or the trial of a criminal matter, a lawyer or
law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal matter
shall not make or participate in making an extra-judicial statement that a
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public
communication and that relates to the trial, parties, or issues in the trial or
other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial, except
that he may quote from or refer without comment to public records of the
court in the case.
(E) After the completion of a trial or disposition without trial of a criminal
matter and prior to the imposition of sentence, a lawyer or law firm as-
sociated with the prosecution or defense shall not make or participate in
making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to
be disseminated by public communication and that is reasonably likely to
affect the imposition of sentence.
(F) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 also apply to professional discipli-
nary proceedings and juvenile disciplinary proceedings when pertinent and
consistent with other law applicable to such proceedings.
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the Seventh Circuit, in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,6 and
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Hirschkop v.
Snead,' held that the rule did not constitute a prior restraint on
speech and therefore was not presumptively invalid.8  Neverthe-
(G) A lawyer or law firm associated with a civil action shall not during its inves-
tigation or litigation make or participate in making an extrajudicial state-
ment, other than a quotation from or reference to public records, that a
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public
communication and that relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or
prospective witness.
(3) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal
or failure of a party to submit to such.
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a party, except
as required by law or administrative rule.
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of the
action.
(H) During the pendency of an administrative proceeding, a lawyer or law firm
associated therewith shall not make or participate in making a statement,
other than a quotation from or reference to public records, that a reason-
able person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communi-
cation if it is made outside the official course of the proceeding and relates
to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or
prospective witness.
(3) Physical evidence or the performance or results of any examinations or
tests or the refusal or failure of a party to submit to such.
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims, defenses, or positions of an
interested person.
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair hearing.
(I) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 do not preclude a lawyer from re-
plying to charges of misconduct publicly made against him or from par-
ticipating in the proceedings of legislative, administrative, or other inves-
tigative bodies.
(J) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees and as-
sociates from making an extrajudicial statement that he would be prohi-
bited from making under DR 7-107.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 37-38 (1978).
DR 7-107 replaced Canon 20, Newspaper Discussion of Pending Litigation, which stated:
Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation
may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due
administration of justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme
circumstances of a particular case justify a statement to the public, it is unpro-
fessional to make it anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts should not
go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in the court; but even
in extreme cases it is better to avoid any ex parte statement.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 20.
6 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
7 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979).
1 594 F.2d at 368-69; 522 F.2d at 248-49.
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less, the Bauer Court held that the rule was unconstitutional, 9 and
the Hirschkop Court held that it was constitutional only as applied
to criminal jury trials.' 0
DR 7-107 prohibits lawyer comment that is reasonably likely
to prejudice the administration of justice." The Rule rests on
two assumptions. First, it assumes that prohibiting lawyer com-
ment that is reasonably likely to prejudice the administration of
justice is desirable. Second, it assumes that this prohibition does
not deprive lawyers of their free speech rights under the first and
fourteenth amendments. In short, it assumes that "reasonable
likelihood of prejudice" is the standard that correctly defines the
type of lawyer comment that the law may properly prohibit. This
is the assumption that Bauer attacks 12 and Hirschkop defends.'"
The Bauer Court held that "[o]nly those comments that pose a
'serious and imminent threat' of interference with the fair ad-
ministration of justice can be constitutionally proscribed," 14 and,
therefore, that the scope of DR 7-107 is unconstitutionally
broad.15  The Bauer Court rejected the reasonable likelihood of
prejudice standard in favor of the "serious and imminent threat
to fairness" standard. The Hirschkop Court, on the other hand,
found Bauer's serious and imminent threat to fairness standard
inadequate to guarantee fairness. The Hirschkop Court held,
therefore, that it is both constitutionally permissible and desirable
to prohibit lawyer comment that is reasonably likely to prejudice
the administration of justice.' 6
The courts in Bauer and Hirschkop attempt to make conclusive
arguments supporting their own standards.' 7  But both courts'
9 522 F.2d at 251. In Bauer the court reviewed Local Rule 1.07 of the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, which was "substantially the same [as DR 7-107] except
that there is no counterpart to Rule 1.07(a) which is a general introductory section indicat-
ing that lawyers should make no public statements which would have a 'reasonable likeli-
hood' of interference with a fair trial or prejudice." Id. at 252 n.9. For the text of Local
Rule 1.07, see id. at 261-63.
10 594 F.2d at 374.
" DR 7-107 (D), (E), (G)(5), (H).
12 See 522 F.2d at 248-50.
13 See 594 F.2d at 362.
14 522 F.2d at 249.
15 Id.
16 594 F.2d at 370.
17 Both courts also criticized specific provisions of DR 7-107. First, the Bauer court
argued that DR 7-107(A), which prohibits comment during a criminal investigation, is un-
constitutional because the phrase "participating in or associated with the investigation" is
ambiguous and overbroad as applied to nonprosecutors, and because the possibility of
prejudice to the government's case is too remote at the investigative stage. 522 F.2d at
252-53. Second, the court ruled that the prohibition of comment relating to "matters that
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arguments are unpersuasive because there is no constitutionally
significant difference between the reasonable likelihood of prej-
udice standard and the serious and imminent threat standard.18
are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial" (DR 7-107(D), (G)(5)) is unconstitution-
ally vague. Id. at 255-56, 259. Third, the court noted that the prohibition relating to com-
ments on the merits of a case (DR 7-107(B)(6), (G)(4)) must be qualified so that "merits"
only includes factual and not legal or social issues. 522 F.2d at 255, 259. Fourth, the Bauer
court argued that properly drawn restrictions should apply to criminal bench trials as well
as criminal jury trials. This is necessary to insulate the judge from improper prejudicial
material that would reach him only by way of extrajudicial comment and to prevent the
appearance that the judge's decision is based upon improper evidence. Id. at 256-57. Fifth,
the Bauer court argued that the restrictions imposed during a civil action by DR 7-107(G)
are too onerous because of the length of civil trials, the important public issues often in-
volved, and the lawyers' unique opportunity to be an informed, articulate, and accurate
source of information and opinion. Id. at 257-58. Finally, the court argued that DR
7-107(E), which restricts comment during the sentencing stage, is unconstitutionally broad,
reasoning that it is unlikely that any factual matter that could not be presented in court at
the sentencing stage would be communicated to the judge by way of extrajudicial com-
ment. Id. at 257.
The court in Hirschkop agreed that the prohibition against comment relating to matters
that are reasonably likely to interfere with the fairness of a proceeding (DR 7-107(D), (H)
(5)) is unconstitutionally vague when used as a specific rule (although not too vague when
used as a broad constitutional standard). 594 F.2d at 371, 374. The Hirschkop court did not
agree that the Bauer court's gloss on "merits" in DR 7-107(B)(6) and DR 7-107(G)(4) is
necessary, since the qualification is implicit in the rule. 594 F.2d at 370. The Hirschkop
court agreed that the restrictions on comment at the sentencing stage (DR 7-107(E)) are
unconstitutionally broad. Id. at 372. The Hirschkop court also held that the restrictions
imposed by DR 7-107(B), (D), and (F) are unconstitutionally broad as applied to bench
proceedings because judges are not as vulnerable as jurors to prejudice by extrajudicial
comment, and because a judge must be free to consider potentially prejudicial information
as he separates the wheat from the chaff during the course of an ordinary bench trial. 594
F.2d at 371-72. The court in Hirschkop agreed with Bauer that the restrictions on comment
during civil actions, as well as during administrative proceedings (DR 7-107(G), (H)), are
unconstitutional because there is no evidence that lawyers' comments prejudice such pro-
ceedings and because less onerous alternatives are available to assure confidentiality in
proper cases. Id. at 373-74.
The American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards is
rewriting the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY § 3.8 (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980) is a tentative response to the courts'
critiques of DR 7-107. Adopting the Bauer standard, and rejecting Hirschkop, § 3.8(a)(2)(vi)
incorporates the serious and imminent threat standard and does not distinguish between
criminal jury trials and criminal bench trials. Contrary to both Bauer and Hirschkop, § 3.8
does not distinguish between criminal and civil trials as such. Rather, it distinguishes be-
tween criminal trials, civil jury trials and civil bench trials, and applies the restrictions to
the former two only. See id. § 3.8(a)(2). Section 3.8 neither clarifies "involved in the investi-
gation" nor limits restrictions on comments during the investigative stage to prosecutors.
Similarly, it does not include a gloss on "merits" (see id. § 3.8(a)(2)(iv)). Contrary to both
Bauer and Hirschkop, § 3.8(a) imposes restrictions during the sentencing stage. Also, §
3.8(a)(2)(vi) prohibits comments relating to "any other matter that similarly creates a seri-
ous and imminent risk of prejudicing an impartial trial." This prohibition is vulnerable to
the courts' vagueness objection to DR 7-107(D),(E),(G)(5), and (H)(5).
18 This Note attempts the difficult task of proving a negative proposition. One method
of sustaining the thesis that there is no constitutionally significant difference between the
two standards, is to show that Bauer and Hirschkop have failed to demonstrate that any such
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To properly apply either standard, courts must exercise judgment
by weighing numerous relevant factors. Courts, therefore, should
candidly adopt a balancing approach.
I
THE COMPETING STANDARDS
When choosing between the serious and imminent threat
standard and the reasonable likelihood standard, courts and
commentators have assumed that the two standards differ sig-
nificantly.1 9 Courts have been forced to analyze the question in
the abstract because there is no history of application that distin-
guishes the two standards. 20 In the abstract, 21 however, there is
difference exists. Additionally, the Note shows that the semantic differences between the
two standards are not constitutionally significant. The Note concentrates on the arguments
and contributions of Bauer, Hirschkop, and United States v. Tierina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969) because these cases provide the most thorough
treatment of the standards issue.since it was first raised in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941). For other cases dealing with court imposed sanctions for speech that
threatened the fairness of judicial processes, see Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (reversing the conviction of a newspaper owner who violated
Virginia statute that prohibited divulging information regarding proceedings of the Vir-
ginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1966) (reversing contempt convictions of newspaper publisher and associate editor); Wood
v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) (applying clear and present danger standard to reverse
contempt conviction of sheriff for comments on pending grand jury investigation); Craig v.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (applying serious and imminent threat standard to reverse
contempt convictions of publisher, editorial writer, and news reporter); In re Oliver, 452
F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971) (serious and imminent threat standard used to invalidate district
court policy prohibiting all extrajudicial comment by counsel in all pending cases); Chase v.
Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970) (serious and imminent threat standard used to
invalidate court order prohibiting defendants and their attorneys from making any public
statements in relation to pending criminal case). For a collection of pre-Bridges cases, see
Annot., 159 A.L.R. 1379 (1945).
19 See, e.g., 51 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 597 (1974); 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 654 (1976); 30 Sw.
L.J. 507 (1976); 54 Thx. L. REv. 1158 (1976); 30 U. MIAlN L. REv. 459 (1976); 22 WAYNE
L. REV. 1233 (1976).
20 The court in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), which rejected the reason-
able likelihood standard in favor of the clear and present danger standard, indicated that
neither standard was satisfied in that case. Id. at 273. In Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S.
331 (1966), the Court stated that "tilt was ... recognized that [the clear and present
danger] formula, as would any other, inevitably had the vice of uncertainty ... but it was
expected that ... from the formula's repeated application by the courts, standards of per-
missible conduct-would emerge." Id. at 334. Compare United States v. Garcia, 456 F. Supp.
1354 (D.P.R. 1978) (rejecting the reasonable likelihood standard and incorporating the
serious and imminent threat standard in restrictive order) with People v. Dupree, 88 Misc.
2d 780, 388 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (reasonable likelihood, not serious and imminent
threat, held proper standard for restriction of lawyer comment).
21 The two standards must be examined in the abstract. Bauer and Hirschkop are the
only cases that have assessed the constitutionality of DR 7-107 and both were declaratory
judgment actions.
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no constitutionally significant difference between the two stan-
dards.
A. The Serious and Imminent Threat Standard
The Seventh Circuit in Bauer 22 and the dissent in Hirschkop,23
offered five comprehensive arguments for the serious and immi-
nent threat standard. For these arguments to succeed, they must
show a constitutionally significant difference between the serious
and imminent threat standard and the reasonable likelihood of
prejudice standard. A close analysis, however, shows that they do
not.
First, the proponents of the serious and imminent threat
standard argue that in Bridges v. California 24 the Suprpme Court
rejected the reasonable likelihood standard in favor of the clear
and present danger standard. 25  They argue that the Court re-
cently reaffirmed this rejection in Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia.26 This argument, however, misconstrues Landmark. Al-
though Landmark quotes Bridges with approval, 7 it rejects the
mechanical application of the clear and present danger test, and
emphatically states that clear and present danger is not a "techni-
cal legal doctrine" or a "formula for adjudicating cases."' 28  In
fact, Landmark holds that, when properly applied, "clear and pres-
ent danger" is not a standard, but, rather, a balancing test. " Far
from endorsing Bridges, Landmark damns it with faint praise.
The Bauer Court next argued that its standard is more consis-
tent with the precepts of clarity and precision announced by the
Supreme Court.3 0  But neither standard is inherently clear and
22 See 522 F.2d at 242.
23 See 594 F.2d at 378-81 (Winter, J., and Butzner, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
24 314 U.S. 252, 263, 273 (1941) (clear and present danger standard used to reverse
contempt convictions of newspaper editors and union leader).
25 In this context, courts treat the serious and imminent threat standard as the applica-
tion of the clear and present danger standard. See 594 F.2d at 379.
2f 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978) (reversing conviction of a newspaper owner who violated
Virginia statute that prohibited divulging information regarding the proceedings of the
Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission).
27 Id.
28 Id. at 842 (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 353 (1946) (concurring opin-
ion, Frankfurter, J.)).
29 Id. at 842-43.
30 See 522 F.2d at 249 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)
("an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not' clearly defined.... [W]e
insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited .... [L]aws must provide explicit standards for those who apply
them. ')).
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precise.3' Without a history of application to lawyer comment-
and neither standard has such a history-these standards give lit-
tle notice of precisely what they prohibit; a history of application
would cure this defect equally for either standard. The propo-
nents may be arguing that because situations at each extreme can
be distinguished more easily than situations in the middle, the
more stringent standard, the serious and imminent threat stan-
dard, is clearer and more precise. This is a nonsequitur. The
problem is not in distinguishing one extreme from the other, but
in distinguishing borderline cases. Each standard has borders and
each standard fails to distinguish its borderline cases.
Third, the Bauer Court argued that the serious and imminent
threat standard is more consistent with the constitutional re-
quirement of narrowness, because the "limitation of First
Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or
essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest
involved." 32 This argument rests upon two dubious assumptions.
It assumes that the reasonable likelihood of prejudice standard is
inherently more restrictive than the serious and imminent threat
standard. There is, however, no reason why a likelihood of pre-
judice that makes it reasonable to restrict speech could be less
than serious and imminent. Furthermore, even if the reasonable
likelihood of prejudice standard is more- restrictive of free speech,
the argument assumes that the standard restricts speech more
than is necessary to ensure fairness. This assumption begs the
question and is far from obviously true. Thus, this argument fails.
Fourth, the dissenters in Hirschkop argued that the reasonable
likelihood of prejudice standard was, designed to retrospectively
gauge infringements of due process for the purpose of remedial
action. 33 According to them, at the time of publication, speech
may create a reasonable likelihood of an unfair trial but the same
speech may not be prejudicial at the time of trial. Therefore, they
argue, the reasonable likelihood test would deter some ultimately
harmless speech and is not adaptable to prospective use. This ar-
gument erroneously assumes that the problem is caused by the
standard rather than by the difference between a prospective and
31 Cf. 30 Sw. L.J. 507, 512 (1976) ("The [Bauer] court never discussed or cited perva-
sive authority for its holding that 'reasonable likelihood' is less clearly defined than is 'seri-
ous and imminent.' ").
32 522 F.2d at 249 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)).
33 594 F.2d at 380 (Winter, J., and Butzner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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retrospective view. The significance of an event is always clearer
in retrospect.
Finally, the proponents argue that a lawyer can only speculate
about whether his comments might be judged retrospectively to
have created a reasonable likelihood of prejudice because of un-
foreseen contingencies.3 4  Therefore, they argue, a lawyer will re-
strict his speech to what is unquestionably safe. But because
'Ifiree speech may not be so inhibited,"35 the proponents argue
that the reasonable likelihood standard is unconstitutional. This
argument ignores the fact that either standard will be applied
prospectively by the lawyer and retrospectively by the court. Con-
sequently, this argument fails to support the adoption of the seri-
ous and imminent threat standard.
B. The Reasonable Likelihood of Prejudice Standard
The Fourth Circuit in Hirschkop, and the Tenth Circuit in
United States v. Tijerina,36 offered thorough arguments for the
reasonable likelihood of prejudice standard. For these arguments
to succeed, they must show a constitutionally significant difference
between the reasonable likelihood of prejudice standard and the
serious and imminent threat standard. Counter-arguments, how-
ever, demonstrate that these arguments are also unpersuasive.
First, the majority in Tijerina argued that the Supreme Court
has placed fair trial rights in a preferred position to free speech
rights, 37 and that the atmosphere of a fair trial must be preserved
at all costs. 38  The Tijerina court argued that because the reason-
able likelihood standard protects fairness more than the serious
and imminent threat standard, it is preferable. The Supreme
Court undercut the premise of this argument when it declared
that neither right has priority. 39 Furthermore, the argument
34 Id.
3. Id. (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)).
36 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.) (reasonable likelihood of prejudice standard used to affirm
contempt convictions of defendants for violating order forbidding extrajudicial discussion
of case), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1,969).
17 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) ("We have always held that the atmo-
sphere essential to the preservation of a fair trial-the most fundamental of all
freedoms-must be maintained at all costs.").
38 See 412 F.2d at 667.
'9 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976) (invalidating court or-
ders restraining newspapers from publishing material potentially prejudicial to murder
trial) ("The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities as between
First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as superior to the
1114 1980]
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would be unsound even if its premise were true. Even if fair trial
rights were preferred to free speech rights, this would not mean
that courts should never risk the loss of an increment of fairness
in order to gain an increment of free speech. The preference
would only mean that at a certain point, where the risk has a
certain degree of probability and the threatened loss has a certain
degree of probability and gravity, courts should no longer risk the
loss of fairness to gain an increment of freedom. Mere preference
does not tell us where this point should be, and therefore does
not tell us which standard is better.
The Hirschkop court also argued that the clear and present
danger standard has proved "inadequate to protect judicial proc-
esses from the kind of extraneous influences which impaired their
fairness ... "40 But although courts proceeding under the clear
and present danger standard have sometimes failed to protect
adequately the fairness of their processes, this shows the courts'
bad judgment, not the inadequacy of the standard. "'It is a ques-
tion of proximity and degree .. .' [and the rule] 'can be applied
correctly only by the exercise of good judgment.' "41
Third, the court argued that because lawyers are officers of
the court, with a special duty "to protect the judicial process from
those extraneous influences which impair its fairness,"42 it is con-
stitutionally permissible to subject an attorney's speech to the
more restrictive reasonable likelihood standard. Judges Winter
and Butzner, partially dissenting in Hirschkop, effectively rebutted
this argument. They maintained that lawyers' status, their access
to information about pending litigation, and the interest their
comments arouse are only evidentiary factors for determining
whether their comments about pending cases should be pro-
scribed.43  "But their profession, unique as it may be, does not
justify measuring their first amendment rights of freedom of
other.... [It is not for us to rewrite the Constitution by undertaking what they declined to
do.").
40 594 F.2d at 365.
41 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 296 (dissenting opinion, Frankfurter, J.) (quoting
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 57 (1919); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466,
483 (1920)).
42 594 F.2d at 366.
4' See 594 F.2d at 381 (Winter, J., and Butzner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); accord, In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ('[Alttorneys and parties
retain their First Amendment rights even as participants in the judicial process."). Contra,
Florida ex rel. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So.2d 904, 910-11 (Fla. 1976);
People v. Dupree, 88 Misc. 2d 780, 787, 388 N.Y.S.2d 203, 208 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (asserting
less stringent standards for restricting attorneys' first amendment rights).
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speech by standards less protective than those accorded other per-
sons." 44  The privilege of practicing law does not justify imposing
conditions on lawyers' first amendment rights.
4 5
Fourth, the court in Hirschkop argued that courts should have
the power to prohibit speech by an attorney if it threatens the
integrity of the court's process "without extended controversy
over the immediacy and gravity of the threatened harm in the
particular case."' 46  The Fourth Circuit argued that the serious
and imminent threat standard invites such extended controversy,
but that the reasonable likelihood standard is more easily satisfied,
and, therefore, is preferable. The Supreme Court has noted,
however, that courts must examine the gravity and probability of
the threat in each particular case.47  The Bauer court correctly
observed that specific restrictions on lawyer comment may only
establish a rebuttable presumption of a punishable threat to the
fair administration of justice.48  "One charged with violating such
a rule would of course have the opportunity to prove that his
statement was not one that posed such a ... threat, but the bur-
den would be upon him."49
Fifth, the proponents argue that because some clearly culpa-
ble conduct, presenting only a potential for prejudice, satisfies the
reasonable likelihood standard but not the serious and imminent
threat standard,50 the former is preferable. But how can the con-
44 594 F.2d at 381 (Winter, J., and Butzner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
', See also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 361 (1976) (plurality opinion) (dismissal of
county employee held to violate first amendment) ("The denial of a public benefit may not
be used by the government for the purpose of creating an incentive enabling it to achieve
what it may not command directly."); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405 (1963) (denial
of unemployment benefits held to violate first amendment) ("[C]onditions upon public ben-
efits cannot be sustained if they so operate, whatever their purpose, as to inhibit or deter
the exercise of First Amendment freedoms").
46 594 F.2d at 368.
47 Whenever the fundamental rights of free speech ... are alleged to have
been invaded, it must remain open to a defendant to present the issue whether
there actually did exist at the time a clear danger; whether the danger, if any,
was imminent; and whether the evil apprehended was one so substantial as to
justify the stringent restriction interposed by the legislature.
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 844 (1978) (quoting Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 378-79 (1927) (concurring opinion, Brandeis, J.)).
48 See 522 F.2d at 251; see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S.
829, 843-44 (1978).
49 522 F.2d at 251.
" See 594 F.2d at 368. The Hirschkop court discussed the example of a prosecutor who
publicly announces that he has obtained a full confession from the defendant. If the con-
fession is later held to be inadmissible, the prosecutor's announcement has gravely
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duct be clearly culpable if it presents a only potential for prejudice?
Presumably the potential for prejudice is sufficient to make it
clear that restrictions ought to be imposed. But if it is clear that
restrictions ought to be imposed, what reason is there to suppose
that the serious and imminent threat standard would not also
warrant the imposition of restrictions? The argument gives none,
and, therefore, simply begs the question.
Sixth, the Hirschkop court argued that determining whether a
comment creates a reasonable likelihood of prejudice requires less
speculation than determining whether it creates a serious and
imminent threat.51 Therefore, they argue, the serious and immi-
nent threat standard involves more uncertainties, and its prohibi-
tions are less clear and definite. Both standards, however, require
courts to calculate the probability of the threatened harm. Be-
cause such* a calculation involves anticipating subsequent events,
problems of uncertainty plague both standards.
The Hirschkop court also noted the statement in Sheppard that
a judge should take remedial action "'where there is a reasonable
likelihood that prejudicial news' would prevent a fair trial ....
The Hirschkop court argued that the rules for avoiding harm
should apply the same standards as rules for remedial action, and,
therefore, that Sheppard implicitly approved the reasonable likeli-
hood standard for rules restricting lawyer comment. The problem
with this argument is that restrictions of speech differ radically
from remedial techniques. Restrictions of speech impinge upon
constitutional liberties, while remedial techniques, such as post-
ponement of the trial to allow public attention to subside, seques-
tration of jurors or declaration of a mistrial, do not. The stan-
dards need not be the same for each.
Finally, the Hirschkop court argued that rules governing
lawyer comment would be "meaningless if sanctions could be im-
threatened the integrity of the trial. This potential for prejudice, according to the court, is
enough to satisfy the reasonable likelihood standard. But the defendant may decide not to
contest the admissibility of the confession or he may contest it and lose. Because of these
possibilities, the court reasoned that the serious and imminent threat standard may not be
satisfied. Id. Significantly, the Hirschkop court admitted that if the serious and imminent
threat standard is satisfied in this situation, "the present debate may be only a matter of
semantics, not a matter of constitutional doctrine." Id. at 368 n.13. This example, and the
court's uncertainty about whether the standard is satisfied, show that the imposition of
restrictions requires the weighing of all the relevant factors, not the mechanical application
of broad constitutional standards. They also show that the proper application of each stan-
dard requires this same balancing, so that in practice, the difference between the standards
is not of consitutional dimension. The standards are pragmatically equivalent.
", See 594 F.2d at 368.
52 594 F.2d at 369 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966)).
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posed only when the lawyer's published speech creates unremedi-
able prejudice." 53 To have meaning, they argue, the rule must
prevent the lawyer's creation of a reasonable likelihood of prej-
udice. They conclude, therefore, that the reasonable likelihood
standard is adequate to protect fairness and the serious and im-
minent threat standard is not. The flaw in this argument is
apparent; "imminent" does not mean "unremediable." There is no
reason to think that the serious and imminent threat standard
would warrant restrictions only when irremediable prejudice had
already been created.
II
THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENCES
One last way to test the thesis that there are no constitution-
ally significant differences between the standards is to examine
the semantic differences between those standards. The courts did
not distinguish them in this way, but they simply assumed that the
standards are significantly different. Perhaps they based this as-
sumption on semantics.
Three possible differences, based on language, exist between
the standards. First, under the serious and imminent threat stan-
dard, it must be "clear" that the speech will be prejudicial before a
court may impose restrictions. Under the reasonable likelihood
standard, however, the likelihood of prejudice need only be
"reasonable." Second, the serious and imminent threat standard
requires "serious" interference with fairness to justify the restric-
tion of speech, while the reasonable likelihood standard does not
distinguish degrees of interference with fairness; any reasonably
likely degree of prejudice is enough to warrant restrictions. Third,
under the serious and imminent threat standard, the threat must
be "imminent." As long as other methods of avoiding prejudice
are available, the threat is not "imminent." The reasonable likeli-
hood standard lacks such an imminence requirement.
These distinctions are flawed. The standards are properly
understood only in relation to the question each is designed to
answer: when does the interest in the fairness of judicial processes
warrant restriction of speech? 54 One standard answers: when the
53 594 F.2d at 370.
" See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 296 (1941) (dissenting opinion, Frankfurter,
J.) ("[T]he phrase 'clear and present danger' is merely a justification for curbing utterance
where that is warranted by the substantive evil to be prevented.").
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likelihood of prejudice is such that it is reasonable to restrict
speech in order to protect fairness. The other standard answers:
when the threat to fairness posed by speech is serious and immi-
nent. The former tells neither how grave the interference with
fairness must be to constitute prejudice, nor how likely the prej-
udice must be for the imposition of restrictions to be reasonable.
Similarly, the latter tells neither how grave the threat must be to
be serious, nor how probable it must be to be imminent. "No def-
inition could give an answer" 55 because it involves a question of
proximity and degree and each standard can be applied correctly
only by the exercise of good judgment.56 Therefore, "[u]nder
any one of the phrases, reviewing courts are brought in cases of
this type to appraise the comment on a balance between the de-
sirability of free discussion and the necessity for fair adjudication,
free from interruption of its processes." 57  In other words, the
differences between the two standards are not of constitutional
dimension .58
Each of the three attempts to distinguish the standards fails.
The first gratuitously assumes that, according to the reasonable
likelihood of prejudice standard, it is reasonable to impose restric-
tions on speech even if it is less than "clear" that the speech will
be prejudicial. The second gratuitously assumes that any degree
of interference with fairness, no matter how trivial, constitutes
"prejudice" within the meaning of the reasonable likelihood stan-
dard. The third gratuitously assumes that, according to the
reasonable likelihood of prejudice standard, it is reasonable to
impose restrictions even though less onerous methods of avoiding
prejudice are available. On its face, the reasonable likelihood of
prejudice standard carries none of these implications, and, there-
fore, these attempts to distinguish the standards fail.
III
BALANCING APPROACH
Courts should recognize that there is no constitutionally sig-
nificant difference between the two standards, and should focus
on the real issue 'at hand-the need "to make [their] own inquiry
into the imminence and magnitude of the danger said to flow
5 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348 (1966).
s See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. at 252 (dissenting opinion, Frankfurter, J.).
5 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. at 336.
SS See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. at 295 (dissenting opinion, Frankfurter, J.).
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from the particular utterance and then to balance the character of
the evil, as well as its likelihood, against the need for free and
unfettered expression." 59 Three reasons support a balancing ap-
proach. First, fair trial rights have no priority over free speech
rights. 60  Second, in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia61
and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,62 the Supreme Court en-
dorsed a balancing approach to determine when the interest in
the fairness of judicial processes warrants restricting the freedom
of speech.63 Third, whether proceeding under the reasonable
likelihood of prejudice standard or the serious and imminent
threat standard, courts already have been using a balancing ap-
proach.64 It would be far less confusing to trial judges and
lawyers if the courts and the Code of Professional Responsibility
candidly acknowledged this.
The courts have already made considerable progress in iden-
tifying .the factors to be considered under a balancing ap-
proach. 65  These include: (1) the availability of less onerous alter-
natives; 66 (2) the length of the proceeding, and, therefore, of the
" Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. at 843.
60 See note 39 and accompanying text, supra.
61 435 U.S. at 842-43.
62 427 U.S. at 562.
63 Cf 30 Sw. L.J. 507, 508 (1976) (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951),
as inaugurating this approach).
64 In Bridges v. California, 324 U.S. 252, 263, 273 (1941) the court appeared to reject
the reasonable likelihood of prejudice standard in favor of the clear and present danger
standard. Justice Frankfurter wrote a strong dissent in Bridges, stating that the question of
when to restrict speech in the interest of fairness is a question of proximity and degree
which requires the exercise of good judgment rather than the mechanical application of
shorthand phrases. 314 U.S. at 295-96 (dissenting opinion, Frankfurter, J.). Five years la-
ter, in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1966), the Court proceeded under the clear
and present danger rubric, but added that the selection of a rubric "depends upon a choice
of words," and that "[u]nder any one of the phrases, reviewing courts are brought in cases
of this type to appraise the comment on a balance between the desirability of free discus-
sion and the necessity for fair adjudication." Id. at 336. Justice Frankfurter, this time con-
curring, wrote that "'[c]lear and present danger' was never used ... to express a technical
legal doctrine or to convey a formula for adjudicating cases." 328 U.S. at 353. Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), quotes with approval Justice
Frankfurter's Pennekamp concurrence and states that, properly applied, the test is a balanc-
ing test. Id. at 842-43.
6 For an excellent discussion of these factors, see Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer, 522 F.2d at 250.
66 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 562-63; Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d
at 373; Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 249. Such alternatives might
include: (a) change of venue; (b) postponement of the trial to allow public attention to
subside; (c) thorough questioning of prospective jurors to screen out those with fixed opin-
ions concerning guilt or innocence; (d) the use of emphatic and clear instructions concern-
ing the duty of each juror to decide the issues only on evidence presented in court; and (e)
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proposed restrictions; 67 (3) the involvement of important social or
legal issues; 68 (4) the importance of the timeliness of comment; 69
(5) the gravity of the litigants' interests; 70 (6) the need for a check
upon governmental discretion; 71 (7) the lawyers' unique oppor-
tunity to be an informed, articulate, and accurate source of in-
formation; 72 (8) the vulnerability of the decision maker to prej-
udicial comment; 73 (9) the vulnerability to prejudicial comment of
the particular type or stage of proceeding involved; 74 (10) the in-
fluence of unrestricted comment on the public's opinion of the
integrity of judicial process; 75 (11) the probable effectiveness of
the restriction in insulating the decision maker from prejudicial
comment; 76 and (12) the need or desirability of comment to coun-
terbalance prejudice that already exists.7 7
Some commentators object to a balancing approach, arguing
that it would create uncertainty about the extent of the first
amendment guarantee to lawyers and would have a chilling effect
on the exercise of free speech z.7  First, the approach would create
no loss of certainty; courts are already balancing.7 9 To candidly
acknowledge this would increase certainty by eliminating confu-
sion about the proper role of the courts. Second, the reasonable
likelihood of prejudice standard and the serious and imminent
threat standard are both too abstract to be helpful. Although a
history of cases dealing with lawyer comment could cure the stan-
dards of this defect, such a history simply has not developed. And
to the extent that the standards do provide some guidance, there
is nothing to prevent a court that uses a balancing approach from
sequestration of jurors to insulate them from trial publicity and to dissipate the impact of
pretrial publicity. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 563-64. See also Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 357-62.
67 See Hirschkop v.,Snead, 594 F.2d at 373; Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522
F.2d at 258.
68 See 594 F.2d at 373; 522 F.2d at 258.
6 See 594 F.2d at 373; 522 F.2d at 250.
70 See id. at 257-58.
7, See 51 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 597, 607 (1974).
72 See id. at 250.
73 See 594 F.2d at 371-72; 522 F.2d at 256-57.
, See 594 F.2d at 372-74.
, See 522 F.2d at 253, 256-57.
76 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 562, 565; 594 F.2d at 370-72; 522
F.2d at 257.
7 See id. at 250; 30 U. MIAMI L. REv. 459, 464 (1976).
78 See 51 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 597, 607 (1974).
71 See note 64 and accompanying text, supra.
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taking advantage of this guidance.8 0 Finally, a balancing ap-
proach is not completely rudderless; the factors used in balancing
do provide some guidance.8
CONCLUSION
As Bauer and Hirschkop show, courts have evaluated the con-
stitutionality of DR 7-107 by comparing the "reasonable likelihood
of prejudice" standard with the "serious and imminent threat to
fairness" standard. The differences between the two standards,
however, are not constitutionally significant. Courts should can-
didly acknowledge that under either standard, a judge must bal-
ance numerous factors. By isolating these factors and focusing on
their relative importance, rather than the artificial differences be-
tween the two standards, courts would bolster the integrity of the
process and provide lawyers with meaningful guidance concerning
the propriety of attorney comment.
Joseph T. Rotondo
so See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. at 842-43, 845 (using
the clear and present danger test in a balancing approach).
" See notes 65-77 and accompanying text, supra.
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